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Note: In Pari Delicto and the Deterrence
of Antitrust Violations
I. INTRODUCTION
Deterrence of antitrust violations is an important public policy
goal.' Although federal criminal2 and civil3 antitrust actions represent
potent tools in pursuing that goal,' funding has not kept pace with
the enormous expense required to enforce the law systematically,$
and, despite their unusually high success rate, government suits are
simply too infrequent6 to prevent large-scale violation of the law.
Thus, even though the success rate of private civil damage actions7
1. Competitive business practices are assumed to be essential to the well-being
of the American economy. Competition supposedly yields the optimal allocation of
national resources, goods of the highest quality at lowest prices, and maximal in-
dustrial health and progress. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958) (dictum). It is the general purpose of antitrust enforcement to ensure that such
competition survives. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.. 392
U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968).
2. See Sherman Act § 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (Supp. V 1975).
3. See Sherman Act §4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970); Clayton Act § 4a, 15 U.S.C. § 15a
(1970).
4. In the period 1960-1964, the Justice Department won 85% of its cases. This
figure includes civil actions terminated by consent decrees and criminal actions in
which pleas of noto contendere were entered. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust
Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 381-82 (1970). The Justice Department has already
won 34% of all actions filed in 1975-1976, with a substantial number of the remainder
still in litigation. See [1977] 4 TRADm REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075.
5. Posner hypothesizes that the number of cases brought by the Justice Depart-
ment has not increased significantly, despite the tremendous growth of the economy,
because the price of enforcement has risen even faster than prices in general: "the
same percentage of Gross National Product devoted to antitrust enforcement buys less
of it than formerly." Posner, supra note 4, at 367.
6. In 1976 the government instituted only 65 civil and criminal actions. Of these.
26 (40%) were criminal, and 39 (60%) were civil. See [1977] 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
45,075. Although this total is higher than the Justice Department's average since
1940, see Posner, supra note 4, at 385 (from 1940 through 1969 the government insti-
tuted an average of 38 actions per year), the number of suits instituted has not varied
significantly in recent years, see [19751 ATr'Y GEN. RE'. ON FED. LAw ENroRcFmm-r
AND CRim. JusT. AssisTANc Acrivrrms 137 (67 actions were filed in 1974; 72 in 1975).
7. Private civil damage suits are authorized by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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falls far short of that enjoyed by the Justice Department," the relative
frequency9 of these suits makes the deterrent effect of treble damage
actions"° an increasingly important aspect of the effort to eliminate
anticompetitive activity.
Ironically, the parties best situated to maintain private antitrust
actions are often those who have themselves been participants in
anticompetitive activity. Persons involved in a conspiracy may pos-
sess evidence of illegality unobtainable by government prosecutors or
uninvolved third persons." Such coconspirators are therefore
uniquely equipped to prosecute a civil action against another offend-
ing entity, and the ability to tap this group as potential plaintiffs
should have a dual deterrent effect. First, it should make past viola-
tions easier to detect and prove, and, second, it should make entities
contemplating joint anticompetitive activity less willing to risk trust-
ing each other.
Historically, however, antitrust defendants have shielded them-
selves from liability to culpable plaintiffs with the equitable defense
of in pari delicto,'2 which barred a plaintiff's action for the redress of
Parties suing under section 4 function as "private attorneys general," Alpine Phar-
macy, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1092 (1973), "supply[ing] an ancillary force of private investigators to supplement the
Department of Justice in law enforcement," Weinberg v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 48 F. Supp.
203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), thereby deterring anyone contemplating anticompetitive
conduct. See 13 J. VON KAIUNOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 99.03,
at 99-4 (1977). But see note 95 infra for a discussion of the inefficacy of the private
plaintiff's remedies as a deterrence mechanism.
8. In 1969, for example, only eight of 221 cases ended in judgment for the plain-
tiff. Another 156 were dismissed by action of the parties, however, and it is reasonable
to infer that the bulk of these dismissals followed a settlement that was at least
partially favorable to the plaintiff. See Posner, supra note 4, at 382-83.
9. In contrast to the small number of government actions, see note 6 supra, 4,257
private antitrust cases were initiated from 1960 to 1969. Posner, supra note I, at 371.
This figure excludes an additional 2,233 actions that grew out of the "electrical conspir-
acy cases," discussed at note 85 infra. In 1974 alone, the latest year for which statistics
are available, 1,227 private actions were brought. [1974] AD. OFF. OF TilE U.S. CouRTs,
ANN. REP. 226. Private suits are often preceded by a judgment against the defendant
in a Justice Department action. This facilitates private suits because it is "prima facie
evidence" against the defendant. See Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. V 1975).
The government's judgment estops the defendant from denying any matter established
in the prior proceeding. Plaintiff is therefore spared the task of proving a violation and
need only prove injury and the measure of his damages. See 15 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 7, § 111.01, at 111-2, 111-3.
10. See 13 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 7, § 99.03, at 99-4. Although the threat
of treble damage actions is an effective deterrent, it is not without its limits. See notes
93-95 infra and accompanying text.
11. See 13 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 7, § 99.03, at 99-4.
12. The defense takes its name from the Latin maxim, in pari delicto portior est
conditio defenditis ("In a case of equal or mutual fault.., the condition of the...
IN PARI DELICTO
wrongful acts in which he had participated.' 3 This doctrine has tradi-
tionally been justified on the grounds that (1) permitting recovery by
culpable plaintiffs would encourage anticompetitive conduct;" (2)
allowing a wrongdoer to profit from his own illegality would be offen-
sive to our judicial traditions;" and (3) since the actual damages
suffered were at least partially the result of plaintiff's own partici-
pation, the defendant's acts were not the sole or proximate cause of
injury.' 6
In 1968, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court, in
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,' claimed to
reject these traditional justifications for application of in pari delicto
and to foreclose continued use of the defense in civil antitrust ac-
tions.' The opinion, however, was ambiguous. While the repudiation
appeared to be absolute, other language seemed to leave room for
assertion of an equitable defense closely resembling in pari delicto in
certain cases.'" Moreover, each of the minority opinions, representing
the views of five of the Justices,2 emphasized the importance of pre-
[defendant] is the better one."). BLAcK's LAw DicrIoNARY 898 (4th rev. ed. 1968). The
defense should not be confused with other defenses asserted in civil antitrust actions
relating to the plaintiff's culpability or right to recovery. See, e.g., UMW v. Penning-
ton, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (plaintiff's efforts to influence public officials to imple-
ment policies detrimental to competitors do not violate antitrust laws regardless of
plaintiff's anticompetitive intent); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (plaintiff's alleged unclean hands stemming from unre-
lated antitrust violations do not preclude its suit under Sherman Act). See also note
47 infra.
The doctrine's applicability is not limited to antitrust. See, e.g., Tarasi v. Pitts-
burgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152 (3d Cir. 1977) (defense applied to preclude recovery
by "tippees" in 10b-5 suit against "tippers"), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3054
(U.S. Aug. 16, 1977) (No. 77-195). But see Nathanson v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc.,
325 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defense not available to "tippers" against "tippees").
13. See 2 J. POMEROy, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JRumsPRuDENcE § 402, at 117 (5th
ed. 1941).
14. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 36-37, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter.
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
15. See, e.g., id. See generally Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
138 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694, 697-99 (2d Cir. 1921); Bluefields S. S. Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 243 F. 1, 18 (3d Cir. 1917), error dismissed per stipulation, 248 U.S. 595 (1919);
Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Co-operative Theatres, 43 F. Supp. 216. 224 (E.D. Mich.
1941).
16. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 36-37, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter.
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See generally Bishop v. American Preservers
Co., 105 F. 845, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1900).
17. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
18. See text accompanying notes 26-32 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 33-37 infra.
20. Justices White, Marshall, and Fortas concurred separately. Justice Harlan,
joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in part and dissented in part.
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serving some defense that would prevent culpable plaintiffs from
recovering antitrust damages.2 Thus it is not surprising that, despite
the apparent clarity and breadth of the plurality's holding, the Perma
Life decision has created confusion among the lower courts.
This Note, in order to define the appropriate role of the defense
in antitrust litigation, will review the current judicial approach to in
pari delicto and examine the various factors that promote or discour-
age antitrust violations. In addition, suggestions will be offered to
the courts for applying the Note's theoretical guidelines to actual
assertions of the defense in antitrust litigation so that the courts will
be equipped with criteria that will enable them to utilize in pari
delicto to maximize deterrence of antitrust violations.
II. PERMA LIFE AND ITS PROGENY:
THEORETICAL DEFECTS
A. THE SUPREME COURT GUIDELINES
The plaintiffs in Perma Life were owners of Midas Muffler
Shops, operating under franchise agreements with defendant Midas,
Inc., a subsidiary of defendant International Parts. Plaintiffs alleged
that provisions of the franchisor's sales agreement that required
purchase of all franchise supplies from Midas, Inc., prevented sales
by franchisees outside a designated territory, fixed retail selling
prices on all goods, and conditioned selling Midas Mufflers on the
marketing of the complete line of Midas products violated section 1
of the Sherman Act 3 and related antitrust statutes." Defendants
urged dismissal under the doctrine of in pari delicto, arguing that
21. See text accompanying notes 38-49 infra.
22. See notes 54-67 infra and accompanying text.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970):
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal: . . . Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy . . . shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
The 1974 amendments to the Sherman Act made violation of section 1 a felony
and increased the maximum penalties to fines of $1,000,000 for corporations and
$100,000 for individuals, or imprisonment for three years, or both. See Antitrust Proce-
dures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93.528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § I
(Supp. V 1975)).
24. Clayton Act § 2(a), as amended by Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1970) (prohibiting price discrimination between different purchasers of comparable
goods); Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970) (proscribing sales or contracts made on
agreement not to use or deal in goods of competitors).
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plaintiffs had willingly sought their franchises with full knowledge
of the allegedly illegal contract provisions, that they had derived
substantial profit from the franchise arrangement, and that they had
sought and acquired additional franchises. On the basis of this in pari
delicto defense the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment.2
Justice Black, writing the plurality opinion,21 found nothing in
the antitrust laws to indicate that Congress had intended to permit
the defense of in pari delicto as a bar to treble damage actions.Y The
plurality held that absent such an intent it was inappropriate to allow
any broad common law2s doctrine to impede private actions that
served an important public purpose.21 Stressing that antitrust en-
forcement was facilitated by the ever-present threat of treble damage
suits and that the "overriding public policy in favor of competition"-'
mandated encouragement of private actions even when the plaintiff
was.also culpable,3' the plurality held that "the doctrine of in pari
delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be
recognized as a defense to an antitrust action. 32
The sweep of this holding was vitiated, however, when Justice
25. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment for defendants on in pari deUcto grounds but reversed the summary
judgment against plaintiffs' related allegations of discrimination by defendants as to
more favorable prices and services for some franchises than others. Perma Life Muf-
flers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967), reu'd, 392 U.S.
134 (1968). The Supreme Court directed the appeals court to reverse the district court
judgment in full and to remand the case for trial. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
26. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Brennan joined in the opin-
ion.
27. 392 U.S. at 138. Although this statement is true, it is equally true that there
is nothing in the legislative history to indicate a congressional disapproval of the in
pari delicto defense.
28. Although inpari delicto is often characterized as a common law defense, see,
e.g., id. at 138, it is more properly identified as an equitable doctrine, see Woolf v. S.D.
Cohn & Co., 521 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 944 (1976); notes 12-13
supra and accompanying text.
29. 392 U.S. at 138. In theory, in pari delicto should never operate as a barrier
to important public purposes because it is an equitable doctrine, see note 28 supra.
originally promulgated to promote public policy in cases where the courts of law
impeded it. See generally.D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.2 (1973).
30.: 392 U.S. at 139.
31. Id. The plurality, emphasized that recovery of a windfall gain by a culpable
plaintiff would not necessarily encourage violations by others since wrongdoers remain
susceptible to civil and criminal penalties for their conduct. It failed to consider,
however, that this approach to antitrust enforcement might foster multiple lawsuits
and inefficient use of the judicial system.
32. Id. at 140.
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Black went on to discuss the relationship between the Perma Life
parties, for his rationale was based at least in part on the fact that
they were not equally culpable.- The plurality rejected defendants'
attempt to depict the franchisees as "actively supporting the entire
restrictive program as such, participating in its formulation and en-
couraging its continuation. ' 34 Noting that acquiescence in the con-
spiracy was the only way for plaintiffs to acquire Midas franchises
and that many of the requirements imposed in the franchise agree-
ment were, in fact, detrimental to their interests, the plurality char-
acterized plaintiffs' participation in the conspiracy as less than fully
voluntary.35 Justice Black conceded that plaintiffs had profited from
the conspiracy but stated that they should not be denied recovery for
making "the best of a bad situation. ' 3 Significantly, however, he left
open the possibility that genuinely voluntary and substantial
participation might bar recovery: "We need not decide. . . whether
such truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic
33. See id. at 140-41.
34. Id. at 140.
35. Id. at 139. The plurality emphasized the plaintiffs' unequal bargaining
power, noting that the plaintiffs "cannot be blamed for seeking to minimize the disad-
vantages of the agreement once they had been forced to accept its more onerous terms
as a condition of doing business." Id. at 140.
It is curious that the Court did not rely more heavily upon Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). In Simpson, plaintiff service station operator alleged that
defendant's requirement that all service station lessees adhere to a "consignment"
agreement that established fixed retail prices violated the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court, after depicting plaintiff as a "small struggling competito[r seeking retail gas
customers," id. at 21, permitted the suit. The case has been cited as support for the
proposition that a plaintiff coerced into anticompetitive conduct by economic pres-
sures is not estopped from bringing suit against the instigator of the conspiracy. See,
e.g., Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F,2d 635, 647 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied.
424 U.S. 942 (1976).
There are two possible explanations for the plurality's failure to utilize the
Simpson rationale. First, as Justice Harlan pointed out in Perma Life, the Simpson
opinion never clearly stated whether the plaintiff had actually committed a forbidden
act. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134. 155 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus the relevance of Simpson
to a case involving an admitted violator is unclear. Second, the Court may have
deemed the Pgrma Life plaintiffs' participation more willful than that of Simpson. See
id. at 139 (plurality opinion) ("They sought the franchises enthusiastically but they
did not actively seek each and every clause of the agreement.") (emphasis added).
36. 392 U.S. at 140. Justice Marshall, however, pointed out that the provisions
of the agreement requiring price maintenance and exclusive territories accrued pri-
marily to the franchisees' benefit and argued that if the court determined that plain-
tiffs were responsible for the inclusion of these provisions, relief should be denied to
the extent plaintiffs' claims for damages stemmed from their existence and enforce-
ment. Id. at 149-50 (Marshall, J., concurring).
[Vol, 62:59
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scheme could ever be a basis, wholly apart from the idea of in pari
delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of action. .. .
The significance of this apparent retreat from a total abolition
of in pari delicto is enhanced by the fact that each of Perma Life's
minority opinions stressed the importance of retaining some bar to
recovery by a culpable plaintiff. Justice White, concurring in the
result, agreed that inpari delicto "in its historic formulation" was not
a useful concept for assessing a plaintiff's right to damages,33 but
contended that a bar to recovery would sometimes be necessary to
-prevent the promise of treble damages from encouraging conduct that
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent? According to Justice
White, a party's right to recover should be contingent upon the fol-
lowing factors:
[1] the relative responsibility for originating, negotiating, and im-
plementing the [anticompetitive] scheme; ... [2] who might
reasonably have been expected to benefit from the provision or con-
duct making the scheme illegal; ... [3] whether one party at-
tempted to terminate the arrangement and encountered resistance
or counter-measures from the other; . ..[41 who ultimately prof-
ited or suffered from the arrangement."°
Justice White believed that by thus posing "the issue of causation in
particularized form"', the courts could ensure that recovery in anti-
trust litigation did not promote antitrust violations.
Justices Fortas and Marshall each separately concurred in the
plurality opinion, arguing that the doctrine of in pari delicto should
continue to play a limited role in civil antitrust litigation." Despite
the potential deterrent effect of allowing all parties to sue without
regard to fault, both Justice Fortas and Justice Marshall felt that
"[tihe principle that a wrongdoer shall not be permitted to profit
through his own wrongdoing""3 makes it appropriate to deny recovery
37. Id. at 140. One commentator, noting this pronounced retreat from the plural-
ity's purported abolition of the defense, remarked that "while there may be no pari
delicto defense in antitrust cases, according to the Supreme Court there is a defense
which looks very much like what many of us used to call the pari delicto defense."
Millstein, Current Status of Affirmative Defenses, Including the Passing-on Defense,
in Pan Delicto and Statutes of Limitations, 38 ANrrrmusr L.J. 111, 115 (1968).
38. 392 U.S. at 143 (White, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's opinion may be seen as
an expansion of the views of the plurality: if in pari delicto is to be abolished, a new,
similar defense should be developed to prevent recovery in cases of egregious plaintiff
fault.
40. Id. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 146.
42. See id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring); id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring); see id. at 148 (Fortes, J., concurring).
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when the plaintiff's fault was substantially equal to the defendant's."
Moreover, they both agreed with Justice White that the supposed
deterrent effect of the plurality rule might well be illusory because a
complete abolition of in pari delicto could actually encourage anti-
trust violations by holding out to violators the opportunity to recoup
losses from coconspirators should their scheme go awry."5
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in part and
dissented in part, arguing that although the lower courts had misused
the doctrine, in pari delicto should be a permitted defense in antitrust
cases. 6 Justice Harlan defined plaintiffs who are truly in pari delicto
as "those who have themselves violated the law in cooperation with
the defendant"'7 and contended that awarding them treble damages
undermined antitrust enforcement and amounted to sanctioning "a
principle of well-compensated dishonor among thieves."'" Although
critical of the inadequacy of lower court formulations of in pari
delicto, Justice Harlan failed to indicate whether a plaintiff would be
"cooperating" if guilty of only de minimis complicity or whether
equal or greater than equal involvement would be required. 9
44. See id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring). In addition to equal fault, Justice
Marshall would have required active participation by the plaintiff in the formation and
implementation of the illegal scheme.
45. Id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring); see id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring).
The plurality's suggestion that plaintiffs' profit from the illegal scheme might be offset
against their losses, id. at 140, was rejected by Justice Marshall as rewarding, on an
unnecessarily speculative basis, an undeserving party simply because his injuries out-
weighed his benefits. Id. at 152 (Marshall, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 153 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
47. Id. This definition did not encompass plaintiffs who (1) knowingly dealt with
defendant violators but did not join them; (2) engaged in anticompetitive activity that
provoked independent activity for which they sued defendant; or (3) were coerced into
joining in defendant's illegal conduct. Id. at 154-55 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Justice Harlan did not elaborate upon these exceptions, and thus the scope of the
proposed coercion defense is unclear. The defense derives from Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), but Justice Harlan never explicitly discussed whether the
defense should be allowed when, as apparently was the case in Perma Life, plaintiffs
are free to seek a franchise with another firm if they do not want to join in the
defendants' illegal conduct. Although neither Simpson nor Perma Life stated that a
coercion defense is possible under such circumstances, their holdings apparently oper-
ate jointly to sanction the rule that a franchisee's participation in anticompetitive
practices, simply to obtain a franchise, will not itself defeat the franchisee's subse-
quent antitrust suit.
48. 392 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Since the complex record before the Court did not disclose whether the plain-
tiffs' conduct violated the suggested standard, Justice Harlan urged that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 153, 156 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 62:59
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The five separate opinions in Perma Life created serious doubts
about the status of in pari delicto. The plurality opinion began the
confusion by stating, apparently without equivocation, that the de-
fense is "not to be recognized" in a civil antitrust action,- only to
intimate immediately thereafter that if a plaintiff were truly of equal
or greater culpability his action might be barred.5 ' Justice White
further obscured the issue by agreeing that in pari delicto should be
eliminated but proposing that fault be used as a basis for dismissing
suits in which antitrust goals would otherwise be frustrated. " The
four remaining Justices disagreed on particulars but unanimously
urged retention of the in pari delicto defense in its traditional form.
Thus, when lower courts had to assess defense motions for dismissal
on in pari delicto grounds, they could not confidently turn to the
Supreme Court for guidelines.
B. LowER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF Perma Life
In interpreting Perma Life, the lower courts have attempted to
adhere to its "holding"5 by focusing on the degree to which the plain-
50. Id. at 140.
51. See id.; notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
52. 392 U.S. at 143-47 (White, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring); id. at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring); id.
at 153 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. To the extent it is discernible amid the confusion, the "holding" of Perma
Life appears to be that the defense of in pari delicto will be available only to a
defendant whose fault is less than the plaintiff's. But see note 147 infra. Two factors
support this interpretation. First, the Perma Life plaintiff was less culpable than the
defendant, and the defense of in pari delicto was disallowed. Second, at least five
Justices-White, Harlan, Stewart, Marshall, and Fortas-were clearly reluctant to
permit treble damage awards to seriously culpable plaintiffs. Moreover, Justice Black's
backtracking in the plurality opinion, see note 37 supra and accompanying text, seems
to support the proposition that the entire Court felt the need to bar recovery to some
plaintiffs who were seriously at fault. Thus, under Perma Life recovery will at least be
allowed where the defendant is more culpable than the plaintiff.
There remains, however, the important question of the availability of recovery
where the culpability of the parties is approximately equal. There are indications, both
in Perma Life and in the opinions of most lower courts following it, that a plaintiff in
a situation of equal culpability should not be allowed to recover. See, e.g., Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968) (plurality opinion);
id. at 146 (White, J., concurring); id. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring); Columbia Nitro-
gen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 16 (4th Cir. 1971); Premier Electrical Constr. Co.
v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970).
Nevertheless, the question was explicitly reserved in Perma Life, see text accompany-
ing note 37 supra, and, as will be pointed out below, so long as the goal remains
maximization of deterrence, a plaintiff of equal fault should be allowed to recover his
damages. See note 127 infra and accompanying text. The language of the above cited
cases notwithstanding, therefore, it would appear that in pa delicto is only appropri-
ate in cases where the plaintiff is more at fault than the defendant. See generally
1977]
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tiff was at fault. Thus, most courts have agreed that plaintiffs who
are substantially less culpable than defendants should not be barred
from recovery. 5 In Greene v. General Foods Corp., 5 for example, the
court disallowed the defense, focusing on the plaintiff's bargaining
power and the extent of his participation in the illegal conduct. Plain-
tiff had sued for treble damages after defendant terminated the plain-
tiff's distributorship for failure to abide by an illegal retail price
maintenance scheme. The court found that plaintiff (1) was not in-
volved in the creation of the conspiracy, (2) did not participate in the
fixing of prices, and (3) had greatly inferior economic bargaining
power. 5 Under these circumstances, the court stated, imposition of
in pari delicto would "thwart the enforcement of the antitrust laws.""
Conversely, courts have permitted the defense of in pari delicto
when the plaintiff was of equal or greater fault." In Dreibus v.
Wilson, 0 plaintiffs and defendants formed a corporation to adminis-
ter a contract with a fabric mill that granted plaintiffs' company an
exclusive distributorship for a fabric in short supply in the United
States. Defendants gained control of the corporation, allowed the
Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1073, 1098
(D.N.J. 1973) (dictum), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 521 F.2d 1230 (3d
Cir. 1975); Morton v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(dictum), aff'd per curiam, 414 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006
(1970).
55. See, e.g., Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 402 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1968) (in pari delicto
would not bar service station lessee's suit alleging Sherman Act violations stemming
from defendant's requirement that lessee sign a resale price maintenance agreement
as a condition of the lease); Lanier Business Prod. v. Graymar Co., 355 F. Supp. 524
(D. Md. 1973) (defendants' counterclaims for antitrust violations allowed be'cause the
defendants lacked equal responsibility for the injuries suffered; in such cases, degree
of fault is relevant only to computation of damages). Although Lanier is in line with
the majority of lower court opinions in terms of its outcome, the standard it adopted
is illustrative of the lack of clarity in the courts' rationales for allowing or disallowing
in pari delicto: antitrust policy would not be served by permitting recovery to a party
"responsible f6r the lawlessness in question." Id. at 527.
56. 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
57. Id. at 646-47. The Greene court recognized that these three factors made the
case factually similar to Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), and ruled that
"[oln the authority of Simpson and Perma Life" plaintiff would not be barred. 517
F.2d at 647. Thus, the court found it unnecessary to determine explicitly whether
plaintiff was coerced or simply acquiesced in defendant's illegal conduct. See note 47
supra.
58. 517 F.2d at 647.
59. See, e.g., Premier Electrical Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132,
1138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); cf. Skouras Theatres Corp. v, Radio-
Keith-Orpheum Corp., 58 F.R.D. 357, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (evidence presented on
motion inadequate for summary judgment based on equal culpability).
60. 529 F.2d 170 (1975).
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contract to lapse, and then negotiated a new contract with the mill
for their own benefit. Plaintiffs brought a derivative suit alleging that
defendants' creation of an exclusive distributorship violated the
Sherman Act. The trial court, conceding that exclusive distributor-
ships could constitute a restraint of trade, dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because
plaintiffs, as "'the originating, active persons responsible for [the
conspiracy's] establishment,' " evinced a degree of involvement in
illegality great enough to warrant dismissal under Perma Life."
The apparent agreement among the lower courts that degree of
culpability is to be the basis of allowing or disallowing the defense of
in pari delicto masks very real differences over how culpability
should be determined. In Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc.," for
example, plaintiff sued an organization that had been formed by
tire distributors to increase their market power by purchasing a
quota of tires from Uniroyal and limiting sales to assigned, exclusive
areas. Although plaintiff had eagerly sought entrance to the cartel
and, while a member, had become one of the largest tire distributors
in the United States, the court permitted the plaintiff's suit because
it, could-not be said that the "illegal conspiracy would not have
been formed but for the plaintiff's participation."" Thus, the Jave-
lin court's assessment of culpability rested solely upon the parties'
involvement in the initiation of illegal activity.'3 On the other hand,
some courts have used a much broader test of fault. In Columbia
Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., " a breach of contract action wherein
defendant asserted an antitrust defense based on plaintiff's alleged
reciprocal dealing, the court stated its in pari delicto test as follows:
"when parties of substantially equal economic strength mutually
participate in the formulation and execution of the scheme and bear
61. Id. at 174 (quoting district court opinion).
62. Id.
63. 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
64. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
65. By focusing on the formation of illegal conspiracies, the Javelin court may
have placed disproportionate weight upon what should more properly be only one
factor in a determination of culpability since a more expansive examination of all the
relevant evidence might have produced a contrary result. For a discussion of other
factors to be considered, see text accompanying note 40 supra; pp. 84-86 infra.
An alternative interpretation of the Javelin opinion, however, is that plaintiff's
lack of involvement in the conspiracy's formation may have been sufficient to render
its otherwise extensive involvement approximately equal to that of the defendants
who had initiated the scheme. If this were the case, Javelin would apparently be the
only instance where plaintiff and defendant fault was found to be in equipoise. In such
a case, disallowance of in par delicto is proper. See note 54 supra; note 127 infra and
accompanying text.
66. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
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equal responsibility for the consequent restraint of trade, each is
barred ... ."7
C. SHORTCOMINGS IN JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the defense of in pari
delicto remains available, despite Justice Black's admonition that it
is "not to be recognized" as a defense in antitrust law. Rather than
rejecting the defense in toto, the lower courts appear to be develop-
ing a doctrine that permits recovery only when the party seeking it
is less culpable than its opponent. 8 Unfortunately, however, the
lower courts so far have neither articulated a comprehensive defini-
tion of culpability nor standardized their assessment of in pari
delicto claims.69 Their reliance upon culpability as the appropriate
test is a logical extension of Perma Life, however, and it may there-
fore be inferred that the Supreme Court's own failure to define
culpability contributed significantly to this shortcoming.
Besides the lack of consistency, there is another, more serious
problem inherent in the position the lower courts have adopted, and,
again, its origin lies in Perma Life. Clearly, abolishing the in pari
delicto defense has the inevitable consequence of allowing a plaintiff
to recover damages for illegal conduct in which he has been a signifi-
cant participant. The implicit assumption made by the Perma Life
plurality was that a supposed increase in deterrence outweighs the
ethical incongruity of allowing a wrongdoer to profit through his own
wrongdoing." Even if such an assumption is warranted," it is clear
67. Id. at 15-16. A number of other tests of culpability have been used by the
courts. See, e.g., South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 784 (6th
Cir. 1970) (suggesting a test looking to initiation and continuing involvement in illegal-
ity, without any indication of a need to examine the respective bargaining power of
the parties), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971); Premier Electrical Constr. Co. v. Miller.
Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir.) ("[PIlaintiffs who do not bear equal responsi-
bility for creating and establishing an illegal scheme, or who are required by economic
pressure to accept such an agreement, should not be barred .... "), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 828 (1970). See also American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
1073, 1098 (D.N.J. 1973) (gauging a franchisee's culpability by asking whether it insti-
gated the conspiracy and was "more forceful in asserting its rights under the
[anticompetitive] franchise agreement than any other franchisee"), afJ'd in part,
rev'd in part, vacated in part, 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
68. This doctrine has not been universally applied. See notes 63-67 supra and
accompanying text.
69. Justice White proposed a broad test of culpability in his Perma Life concur-
rence. 392 U.S. at 146-47. Because this test was simply one of the many suggested
approaches to the defense proposed in the decision's minority opinions, it is not sur-
prising that the lower courts have not acknowledged or relied upon his formulation,
70. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968). See generally id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring).
71. Justice Marshall's statement that "[tihe principle that a wrongdoer shall
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that the appropriate role of in pari delicto can only be defined by
determining whether its abolition or its retention would have the
greater deterrent effect on anticompetitive activity. 2 There are two
questions relevant to such an inquiry:
(1) If in pari delicto is abolished, will the potential anti-
trust violator be deterred from illegal behavior by the knowl-
edge that he is susceptible to suit by his coconspirators?
(2) If the defense is available, will the potential viola-
tor be deterred by the knowledge that, if his anticompetitive
scheme produces loss instead of profit, remedial action
against his coconspirators is barred?
The Perma Life opinions simply assumed the answers to these
questions. Justice Black limited in pari delicto in order to deter po-
tential violators with the threat of civil action." Justice White, al-
though concurring in the abolition of the defense, argued that if there
were no bar to recovery potential violators would have a "can't lose"
opportunity: either they would reap illicit profits or they would re-
coup their losses via treble damage suits against coconspirators. 1
The remaining opinions echoed Justice White's theory of counter-
deterrence and urged preservation of the in pari delicto doctrine in
limited form.75 Thus, both the Supreme Court's proponents and
not be permitted to profit through his own wrongdoing is fundamental in our jurispru-
dence," id. at 151, demonstrates that this assumption is still a matter of controversy.
Nevertheless, the bulk of relevant case law treats private antitrust enforcement as a
policy goal of such importance that it warrants disregarding general equitable doc-
trines. See, e.g., id. at 138-39. Because equity evolved to promote fairness when com-
mon law rules produced unjust results, this position appears to be sound. See generally
D. DOBBS, supra note 29, § 2.2. Since in this instance the legal remedies produce just
results by promoting competition, modern courts should not apply the equitable doc-
trine of in pan delicto with such rigidity that it would defeat this public policy goal.
See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
72. Commentators have generally agreed with this approach to in pari delicto.
Their arguments for or against use of the doctrine, however, tend to be conclusory and
ignore the need for a careful analysis of the deterrent effect of the defense in any given
case. Compare Note, Rethinking In Pan Delicto: An Antitrust Policy Analysis, 3 FLA.
ST. U.L. Rhv. 360, 373 (1975) ("Although the question is not susceptible of empirical
proof, it seems unrealistic to argue that a potential conspirator, contemplating illegal
business dealings, seriously considers whether legal redress from his coconspirators will
be available should the enterprise fail."), with Ellis, In Defense of In Pari Delicto, 56
A.B.A.J. 346, 348 (1970) ("[Plarties in an equal fault situation. . . are less likely to
be concerned about being sued since the premise of the bargain is mutual benefit ...
[They] are more likely to be deterred by the knowledge that if matters later turn sour
for them the defense of in pari delicto will preclude any attempt to recover any loss.").
73. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968).
74. Id. at 146 (White, J., concurring).
75. See text accompanying notes 42-49 supra.
1977]
MINNESOTA LA W RE VIE W
opponents of in pari delicto purported to "support" their positions
with the unsupported pronouncement that their particular position
was necessary for deterrence.
At the heart of the Court's lack of consensus was a failure to rec-
ognize or discuss those factors that go to the essence of deterrence.
Each of the Perma Life opinions voiced the assumption that an egre-
gious wrongdoer in any conspiracy should not be permitted to recover
from lesser participants because counterdeterrence would result. In
other words, the wrongdoer would actually be encouraged to break
the law. This assumption may not prove accurate in practice. It is
based on the premise that avoiding reward to significant wrongdoers
is synonymous with promoting deterrence of significant wrongdoing.
But the link between culpability and susceptibility to deterrence is
not apparent because culpability stems from past actions in a parti-
cularized setting, while susceptibility to deterrence depends upon the
nature and tendencies of an individual or entity as they affect at-
tempts to plan future activity. Thus, although culpability and sus-
ceptibility to deterrence may be related concepts," they are not syn-
onymous. By failing to articulate explicitly or perhaps even recognize
this distinction, the Supreme Court greatly confused the in pari
delicto issue and inhibited the deterrent effect that application of the
defense should promote.
The lower courts compounded this problem by adhering to
Perma Life's emphasis on culpability as the benchmark of in pari
delicto availability, instead of making independent inquiry into the
best means to promote deterrence or scrutinizing the assumed
deterrence-culpability nexus. In Greene v. General Foods Corp.," the
Fifth Circuit found the plaintiff's fault unequal to the defendant's
and proceeded to disallow the defense with only the terse comment
that allowing its use would "thwart the enforcement of the antitrust
laws." 8 Meanwhile, in Dreibus v. Wilson,7" the First Circuit found
sufficient culpability and permitted the application of the defense
without any reference to the Supreme Court's disparate viewpoints
on deterrence." By basing the decision of whether to permit recovery
on the parties' fault, the courts are institutionalizing a standard that
bears only a haphazard relationship to deterrence and is therefore not
an optimal means of achieving antitrust goals.
76. See note 115 infra.
77. 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976). See text
accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
78. 517 F.2d at 647.
79. 529 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
80. 529 F.2d at 174.
[Vol. 62:59
IN PARI DELICTO
I. THE UNDERLYING THEORY OF IN PARI DELICTO
A. INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO ILLEGAL CONDUCT
To determine the appropriate role of in pari delicto in maximiz-
ing deterrence of anticompetitive conduct, it is necessary to examine
why businesses engage in such behavior. Although the goal of almost
all illegal corporate activity is profit,8' not all profit-seeking busi-
nesses behave illegally. This fact probably reflects a balancing by
businesses of the traditional incentives and disincentives to anticom-
petitive conduct that make such conduct both attractive and danger-
ous.
8 2
Antitrust violations result in part from the interrelated effects of
markets and intracompany pressure." Although statements that de-
scribe anticompetitive conspiracy as "the only way a business can be
run" or as "free enterprise" are self-serving exaggerations, trade
81. Cf. Lane, Why Businessmen Violate the Law, in WHrm COLLAR CRmUNAL 88,
101 n.1 (G. Geis ed. 1968) ("Though there are some cases where the law is difficult to
obey, these seem to me to be relatively few as compared to those in which it is merely
more profitable not to obey.") (quoting Corwin Edwards, Director, Bureau of In-
dustrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission).
82. This balancing process is illustrated by the experience of the General Electric
Company, which in the 1950's served as a battleground for two opposing philosophical
positions on the proper role of competition in big business. One group within the
company, perhaps influenced by thirteen antitrust suits in which the company had
been involved in the 1940's, believed that the success of a business enterprise hinged
on its competitive independence. A sizable second group thought that competition was
"for the birds" and that it was "less wearing to take turns on rigged bids than to play
the rugged individualist." Smith, The Incredible Electrical Conspiracy, FoRTUha,
April 1961, at 132, 135. As General Electric's central role in the conspiracies indicates,
the latter group ultimately prevailed. See note 85 infra.
These conflicting positions are illustrated by the story of General Electric's Vice
President, George Burens, an earnest believer in competition, who, after witnessing a
$176 million drop in the company's sales in 1954 and extensive price cuts in 1954-1955,
called a subordinate into his office and ordered him to "crank up.. . the old cartel."
Smith, supra, at 172.
See also "John Q. Lawyer," How to Conspire to Fix Pices, HARv. Bus. REv.,
March-April 1963, at 95, 101 (a tongue-in-cheek guide to the fledgling conspirator that
advises: "[I]f you are getting more than you would have gotten, stay in; if you are
not, get out.") (emphasis in original).
83. See Smith, supra note 82, at 135.
84. See C. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL CONSPIRACY CASES: THE TREaLE DAMAGE
ACTIONS 27-28 (1973); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CPium 234-56 (1949).
85. Smith, supra note 82, at 133. A problem inherent in any attempt to identify
the motivation'behind anticompetitive conduct in order to determine the factors that
promote deterrence is the violators' unwillingness to discuss their own motives. In-
vestigators, however, have gathered extensive information on motivations behind
anticompetitive iractices from corporate executives involved in violations in the
"electrical conspiracy cases," one of the largest antitrust litigations in history, in
which criminal actions were brought against 29 corporations and 45 corporate execu-
tives for fixing prices, rigging bids, and dividing the market on electrical equipment.
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violations occur frequently enough to suggest that, despite its risks,
anticompetitive conduct may in some cases be a "normal" business
strategy." Insofar as one business entity realizes increased profit from
its illegal activity," the pressure upon rival businesses to match those
gains is intensified and may outweigh the perceived importance of
operating within the antitrust laws.8 A General Electric executive
implicated in a major government antitrust prosecution"5 stated that
the cause of his company's wrongdoing was pressure to perform: "All
we got . . . was 'get your percentage of available business up, the
General Electric Company is slipping.'"9 Thus, the pressures of
competition in a marketplace in which antitrust violations have al-
ready occurred tend to produce a managerial emphasis on profit at
any price,9' which intensifies intracompany demands for maximum
gain and may make further anticompetitive conduct inevitable.
Thousands of additional civil actions followed, see Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1972, at 1, col.
6, most brought under section 5 of the Clayton Act. The criminal trials resulted in 7
jail sentences, 24 suspended jail sentences, and fines totaling $1.8 million. The civil
actions cost General Electric alone about $200 million to settle. Id.
This Note will draw heavily upon investigative materials from these cases. Al-
though these cases are obviously distinguishable from the "average" antitrust case
because of their scope, it is likely that all anticompetitive activity is motivated, to
some degree, by considerations similar to those revealed in the "electrical conspiracy
cases." See notes 81-84 supra.
86. In 1971, the Nader Study Group on Antitrust Enforcement released the re-
suits of a questionnaire distributed to the presidents of Fortune's 1000 largest manufac-
turing corporations. The findings revealed that 49.1% of the cooperating members of
Fortune's top 500 had been involved in antitrust litigation in the preceding five years.
See M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM app. B (1971). Because only eleven
percent of the solicited corporations responded, however, these results must be treated
with caution.
87. It is evident that even antitrust violations that are exposed and successfully
litigated may still produce profit to the offender. See note 95 infra.
88. Competitors may also attempt to improve their relative position by supply-
ing information about their rival's illegal activity to the Justice Department.
Government-initiated antitrust actions, however, are selective and infrequent, see
notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text, and, even when successful, may not make
otherwise profitable activities unattractive or diminish an illegally acquired share of
the market, see note 95 infra. Moreover, the chief motivation of all businesses is
profit, not law enforcement. Gains by rivals may therefore motivate attempts to in-
crease profits through illegality rather than through competition,
89. This was one of the "electrical conspiracy cases," discussed at note 85 supra.
See generally C. BANE, supra note 84.
90. Smith, supra note 82, at 170. According to Clarence Bule, a General Electric
executive, "[Wie . . . had no trouble getting the most innocent persons to go along.
[If they didn't want to do it, they knew we would replace them." Id. at 137.
See also E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 84, at 234 (suggesting a "hypothesis of differential
association" under which illegal conduct in the business world is reinforced when
executives become insulated from vigorous opponents of illegality).
91. See Smith, supra note 82, at 170, 172.
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Although such market and intracompany pressures for profit
maximization are strong incentives to illegal conduct, other factors
will often offset them and deter violations. The most basic, and in-
deed the most frequently cited, reason for antitrust compliance is a
desire to obey the law.2 This desire may stem from a sense of moral-
ity, but it may also be based on a number of more selfish considera-
tions. Treble damages93 and fines," for example, have been cited as
strong disincentives to illegal conduct, and for small or financially
insecure businesses they may be highly effective. A growing body of
data suggests, however, that such penalties may often be ineffective
as deterrents. 5 Another traditionally cited disincentive to illegal con-
duct is adverse publicity." Public notoriety may diminish a violator's
business stature, decrease the desirability of that business as an in-
vestment, or prompt legislation forcing the offender to change its
operations. 7 The impact of adverse publicity depends in part, how-
ever, upon society's perception of, and willingness to invest in and
support, antitrust violators. Although the antitrust laws represent a
strong public policy favoring competition,98 violation of those laws
may not be viewed as being immoral;99 thus, public reaction may
92. See M. GREEN, supra note 86, at app. B.
93. See, e.g., id.; Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
94. See, e.g., M. GREEN, supra note 86, at app. B.
95. It has been persuasively argued that the threat of treble damages is largely
illusory. See, e.g., Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61
CALr. L. Rv. 1319 (1973). Several significant factors lend support to this position.
First, many potential plaintiffs simply do not sue because the statute of limitations,
Clayton Act §4b, 15 U.S.C.A. §15(b) (West Supp. 1977), has run. In addition, the costs
of private litigation if the defendant prevails may be prohibitive, and, absent an "in-
sider's" access to evidence, problems of proof may exist. See Wheeler, supra. at 1330.
Second, even if the plaintiff is awarded final judgment at trial, the consequences to
the violator will rarely be devastating. Because interest is not payable on treble dam-
age awards, the defendant enjoys the free use of his illicit profits until suit is brought
and the lengthy litigation concluded. See id. at 1323. See generally Parker, Treble
Damage Action-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANirrusr BuLL.
483, 486-92 (1971). Moreover, the sum that is finally paid in satisfaction of the judg-
ment is fully deductible in computing taxable income, unless the defendant was con-
victed or pled guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal action either before or after the
commencement of the civil suit, in which case one-third is still deductible. See I.R.C.
§ 162(g); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-22 (1972). Thus, net damages may actually be less than
illegal profits.
That fines cannot be a compelling deterrent to illegality is indicated both by the
relative handful of prosecutions initiated by the government each year. see notes 2.6
supra and accompanying text, and, at least as to major corporate violators, by the
ceiling of $1,000,000 on fines imposed by statute.
96. See generally Anderson, Effective Antitrust Compliance Programs and
Procedures, 1 CoiuoRATE CouNsEL INSrTIUTE PROcEEDINGs 36, 37 (1962).
97. Id.
98. See note 1 supra.
99. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 82, at 135 (defendants knew they had broken the
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cause no significant long-term diminution in an offender's sales or
desirability as an investment.'00 Another deterrent to illegal conduct
is the threat of imprisonment for business executives.'0 ' In egregious
cases, imprisonment is more than a theoretical possibility,'"' and its
potential for deterrence should not be overlooked.' 3 Because it is
used so sparingly, however, the threat of imprisonment as a sanction
has generally proved more illusory than real.'0 '
These disincentives undoubtedly deter many corporations from
engaging in illegal conduct. Nevertheless, antitrust violations con-
tinue, and it is evident that for some firms the lure of windfall profits
often outweighs the dangers of the traditional disincentives. Conse-
quently, it is reasonable to infer that the decision whether or not to
violate the antitrust laws will often turn upon other, perhaps more
basic, considerations.
The most fundamental goal of both the management executive
and the business that he operates is survival: the indispensable con-
dition precedent to power, autonomy, and financial reward.0 5 For a
business entity, survival requires earnings, and ultimately profits,
sufficient to prevent a withdrawal of capital and permit a mainte-
nance level of reinvestment without incurring excessive debt.'00 To
law but felt they had not acted unethically); Wheeler, supra note 95, at 1334-35. But
see M. GREEN, supra note 86, at app. B (84.6% of top 500 and 60.4% of next 500 corpora-
tion presidents responding disagreed with the statement that price-fixing in the electri.
cal conspiracy cases, see note 85 supra, was illegal but not immoral).
100. On August 7, 1960, General Electric common stock closed at 81 3/8. Wall
St. J., Aug. 8, 1960, at 22, col. 2. Six months later, after sentencing was completed in
the electrical conspiracy cases, see note 85 supra, it closed at 68 1/2, Wall St. J., Feb.
8, 1961, at 22, col. 3, but by February 1962 it had rebounded to 75, Wall St. J., Feb. 8,
1962, at 22, col. 3.
101. See M. GREEN, supra note 86, at app. B.
102. See note 85 supra.
103. "Business school professors agree that the price-fixing case, which resulted
in the jailing of several executives, . . . has had a greater impact on their students than
any other incident in recent years." N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1961, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
104. See Posner, supra note 4, at 389, 391; Wheeler, supra note 95, at 1320. Of
54 criminal actions instituted in 1975 and 1976, only four produced nonsuspended jail
sentences (of from ten to sixty days) for any of the defendants. See [19771 4 TI ADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075-76.
105. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 167 (2d rev. ed. 1971). Gal-
braith argues that in the modern corporation survival means preservation of authority
by the "technostructure," an imperfectly defined group that makes major decisions for
the corporate body. Id. at 70-71, 167. This is a consideration that pressures even top
management personnel. According to Smith, supra note 82, at 172, 180, the incoming
general manager of General Electric's Switchgear Division was told that his job would
be "at risk" for two years: "If he performed, he could keep it and become a vice
president . . . . If he was found wanting, he wouldn't be able to go back to his old
job. He'd just be out. [He] promptly joined the . . . conspiracy."
106. See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 105, at 167-68. To the extent that earnings fall
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ensure his personal survival, the managerial executive must therefore
preserve minimally acceptable earnings by guarding his firm's base-
line profit. For firms on the borderline of profitability, this may mean
"put[ting] prevention of loss ahead of maximum return."'' 7 Accord-
ingly, managers of such firms will tend to be risk aversive, and thus
to them the traditional incentives and deterrents to anticompetitive
conduct will acquire special significance.' 0
Although it is possible for some firms to violate the antitrust laws
and to sustain serious penalties while emerging with an increased
profit ratio and market share,' management teams who see their
firms as being on the borderline of profitability may nevertheless
conclude that they cannot risk exposure to the adverse effects of being
found in violation of the antitrust laws. This risk aversion is likely to
persist even though an illegal windfall could lessen their concern
about their own survival. The desirability-in terms of survival-of
increased revenue for the borderline firm is therefore negated by the
importance of eluding disastrous antitrust liability.Ila Thus, the inse-
curity of management renders the traditional deterrents to illegality
more effective for such firms.
Under different business circumstances, however, the manage-
rial emphasis on personal security may also provide the ultimate
motive for antitrust violations. Once a minimum level of earnings has
been firmly established, survival becomes less of a concern, and the
primary goals of business management become increased profits and
growth."' Profits and growth not only directly benefit the business
below this minimally acceptable level, management may be forced to sacrifice its
desire for power and autonomy in order to ensure adequate cash flow. If earnings
seriously decline, management may actually be forced out. See id. at 168.
107. Id.
108. See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An
Economic Analysis, 86 HAv. L. REv. 693, 705 (1973). The individuals running a busi-
ness need not be conscious of the fact that they fall within one category or the other
for their behavior to conform to the model. Indeed, an unstable economy may cause
some firms to fluctuate from one category to the other. Rather, it is the financial health
of an entity that causes aggressive or protective behavior, and the firm's managers will
exhibit aversiveness or not in accordance with the firm's economic well-being at the
time.
109. See generally notes 93-104 supra and accompanying text.
110. See J. GAL.Rimr, supra note 105, at 169. Notwithstanding the general inef-
ficiency of private antitrust litigation as a recovery device for the plaintiff, peripheral
effects of private litigation may be devastating. In 1969, four franchisees of Shakey's
Co. brought suit alleging injury from Shakey's requirement that all spices used in
franchise operations be purchased from the franchisor. This action was settled out of
court for $200,000, but pending resolution of the suit, the company's sale of franchises
virtually ceased for one year, its growth was stifled, and its earnings were reduced
sharply. See Shaffer, New Trustbusters, Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
111. See J. GA.aaRrrH, supra note 105, at 171-72.
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entity, they also indirectly benefit individual executives: profits
foster expansion; expansion fosters increased personal responsibility,
promotions, salary increases, and other personal gains."' The sophis-
ticated executive of a firm operating well above the level of minimally
acceptable profits may therefore conclude that the potential for dis-
aster from anticompetitive conduct is so slight, and the potential
gains-both business and personal-are so substantial, that viola-
tions are worth the risks."' For firms in such a position, the tradi-
tional penalties for antitrust violation are minimally effective as de-
terrents.
Susceptibility to deterrence, therefore, is a function of specific
characteristics of the firm's economic strength and the effect of those
characteristics on the manner in which the firm's executives ap-
proach risk. A judicial decision on whether to allow the assertion of
the in pari delicto defense that purports to be governed primarily
by the effect it will have on deterrence must therefore be based on
an examination of those characteristics. The courts have failed to
do this, relying rather on a generalized sense of culpability., While
it may be that the approach taken by the courts has more often than
not led to a correct result,"' the absence of any necessary connection
between culpability and risk aversiveness inevitably tends to make
the decisions somewhat haphazard, inconsistent, and lacking in any
convincing rationale."' It is the purpose of the final sections of this
Note, first, to define those situations where, given the theory of
deterrence set out above, the defense ought and ought not to be
allowed in order to maximize deterrence and, second, to articulate
factors that will aid the courts in judging when a particular firm is
or is not risk aversive.
112. See id. at 171; R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMic THEORY OF 'MANAOERIAL'
CAPITALISM 102 (1964).
113. See M. GREEN, supra note 86, at 1083; notes 83-91 supra and accompanying
text. See generally J. GALBRAITH, supra note 105, at 176.
114. See notes 68-80 supra and accompanying text.
115. Generally, the more culpable firm is the one whose involvement or partici-
pation in the conspiracy is greater. By and large the major participants in a conspiracy
will be risk taking firms, for they are the only firms that voluntarily undertake illegal
activity. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, the risk aversive
firms, because they rarely enter upon illegal activity voluntarily, see notes 105- 10 supra
and accompanying text, will usually be relatively minor participants. Unfortunately
this relationship between participation or culpability and risk aversiveness is purely
coincidental. It is relatively clear, for instance, that an aggressive, risk taking firm
might well play a minor role in a particular conspiracy. It is just suchi a firm that we
most want to deter, but an analysis based on culpability might well indicate that it
should be allowed to assert the defense (if it is being sued) or recover (if it is suing).
116. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
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B. MAXIMIZING DETERRENCE
As indicated above, the world of potential antitrust violators
may be divided into two classes: firms that, because of their ability
to withstand antitrust liability without significantly endangering
their continued existdnce, are willing to risk such liability in order to
increase profits'17 (the "risk taking firms") and firms that, because
of their marginal profit position, cannot afford such risks because of
the potential threat that antitrust liability poses to their survival",
(the "risk aversive firms"). At the outset it is clear that, although
neither class should be gratuitously encouraged to violate the law,
deterrence efforts should be directed primarily at the risk taking
firms. These firms are prime candidates to play a major role in anti-
competitive activities because the illegality offers an excellent oppor-
tunity to reap windfall profits without a potential for loss substantial
enough to threaten their existence.
As is illustrated by the difficulties that the Supreme Court had
in Perma Life,"' it is impossible to use in pari delicto to promote
deterrence of one group without providing a reciprocal incentive to
another group. A denial of the defense derives its deterrent effect
from the threat of recovery by a coconspirator. Unhappily, however,
that deterrence cannot be achieved unless the coconspirator is al-
lowed to recover. Conversely, if no coconspirator is allowed to sue, no
one is given the incentive of a possible recovery, but the deterrent
effect that can be realized through such suits is lost altogether. Fi-
nally, if the lower courts' current approach to the problem'" is used
and some firms are allowed to sue and others not, a double disincen-
tive'21 is imposed on one group only by giving the other a double
incentive.2 2 It is clear, therefore, that no system will provide deter-
rence without also providing an incentive to one who has participated
117. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 105-10 supra and accompanying text. But cf. Lane. supra note 81
(arguing that businesses in a weak or declining financial position, as measured by
employment cutbacks, are prime candidates for trade practice violations).
119. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
The difficulty. for the Justices in Perma Life was that disallowing the defense would
deter the defendant but provide an incentive for the plaintiff. Although they were
concerned with deterrence, they reached different conclusions about whether the de-
fense could be an effective deterrent. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
120. See notes 54-62 supra and accompanying text.
121. Technically there are not two disincentives, but one disincentive and the
absence of an incentive. When the defense is disallowed to a single class of litigants,
all members of that class are subject to suit (the disincentive) but are not permitted
to recover from nonmembers (the lack of an incentive).
122. Again, there are not two incentives, but an incentive (the possibility of
recovery) and the absence of a disincentive (immunity to suit by coconspirators).
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in an illegal activity. Even assuming that maximization of deterrence
outweighs the ethical anomaly of allowing a wrongdoer to recover,' 3
no system can be justified unless it generally provides both the
greatest deterrence and the smallest incentive to illegal conduct.
Any principled determination of what such a system should be must
rest upon an inquiry into those characteristics that make a firm
more or less susceptible to deterrence and the effect, given such
characteristics, that each of the possible applications of the defense
will have.
There are three possible applications of in pari delicto: (1) the
defense could be abolished, so as to never bar recovery by a coconspir-
ator; (2) the defense could operate as a bar to recovery by coconspira-
tors in every case; or (3) the defense could be applied so as to bar
recovery by some coconspirators but not others. None of the Justices
in Perma Life, nor any of the lower courts following that decision,
has been persuaded by the second alternative.' 4 Such a result is not
surprising. Allowing any degree of participation, no matter how
minor, to act as an absolute bar to suit by a coconspirator is, in terms
of deterrence, the least effective option. Under such a rule, all parties
would be relieved of any threat of suit by coconspirators, and a potent
source of deterrence would be altogether lost. True, the system would
be relieved of the ethical anomaly of allowing a wrongdoer to recover,
and the violators would be deprived of any incentive they might have
if they were allowed to recover. But it cannot be reasonably gainsaid
that the threat of suit by well-informed coconspirators will have a far
greater deterrent effect-even when offset by the possible incentive
of an opportunity to recover-than will the absence of the possibility
of recouping losses should the anticompetitive scheme go awry.' 5
123. See note 71 supra.
124. Despite the plurality's apparent backtracking, see notes 33-37 supra and
accompanying text, it is at least clear that the theoretical possibility of doing away
with all suits by coconspirators was never seriously considered. Moreover, even Justice
Harlan implies that there may be cases where the defense should be disallowed because
the plaintiff is not "substantially as much responsible ... as the defendants." Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 156 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. This conclusion should not be surprising. Complete abrogation of in pari
delicto would open all parties to treble damage liability to coconspirators. An absolute
defense of in pari delicto would completely foreclose this possibility. Risk taking firms
would tend to fear the former prospect more than the latter because additional liability
might upset the calculus of risk that so often allows these firms to break the law with
impunity. For risk aversive firms it would be an additional weapon in the arsenal of
deterrents that such firms already find compelling. Complete foreclosure of the right
to sue coconspirators would, on the other hand, merely deny both types of businesses
the "insurance policy" that is provided by suits to recover unrealized gain. But since
it is unlikely that any firm will willingly enter a conspiracy that lacks a good chance
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One implication of this conclusion is especially important: inso-
far as the threat of suit provides a more effective deterrent to anti-
trust violations than does depriving coconspirators of a possible re-
covery, it follows that in any situation where no reasonable distinc-
tion can be made regarding the conspirators' susceptibility to deter-
rence,'26 all of them should be allowed to sue.'2 The question remains,
however, as to whether, when a distinction between the conspirators
can be made, deterrence is maximized by completely abolishing in
pari delicto and allowing all to sue or by retaining the defense in a
limited form. Phrased somewhat differently, the problem is whether
there are circumstances in which it would maximize deterrence to
prevent some coconspirators from suing even though, as a general
matter, deterrence is best served by allowing such recoveries.
Although deterring risk aversive firms is not an unimportant
objective, the heaviest burden of deterrence should be directed at the
risk taking firms. It is those firms that provide the organizational
impetus for the anticompetitive activity and voluntarily embark
upon the illegality.'12 If they could be effectively deterred, the world
of antitrust violators would be deprived of its leaders. Where, how-
ever, all parties are allowed to sue, these risk takers have an oppor-
tunity to recover their losses should the scheme go awry.' 2' Even if the
threat of suit outweighs the benefit of a possible recovery,"* maxi-
mum deterrence of these firms requires that they be both subjected
to the threat of suit and deprived of the possibility of recovery.
Achieving such a result, however, requires that the courts, in
essence, provide a double incentive to the risk aversive firms:' the
defense of in pari delicto would be available to them but not to their
of success, this deterrent would prove less persuasive than the additional threat of
treble damages.
126. For an outline of some of the factors upon which such a distinction should
be based, see pp. 84-86 infra.
127. Such a conclusion runs directly contrary to what appears to be the present
practice of the courts to allow the in pan delicto defense where the fault of the parties
is equal. See note 54 supra. Allowing the defense in such cases is perhaps the most
important result of giving more weight to a finding of culpability than to the need for
deterrence. See notes 154-64 infra and accompanying text. Although, in a retributive
system, it makes little sense to allow one party to recover from another no more guilty
than he is, the object should not be retribution but deterrence, and deterrence is
maximized by disallowing the defense and allowing recovery in all but the exceptional
case. See notes 128-42 infra and accompanying text.
128. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
129. This is exactly the "no-lose" situation that so troubled the five Justices in
Perma Life who did not join in the plurality opinion. See generally notes 38-49 supra
and accompanying text.
130. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
19771
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
risk taking coconspirators. Thus risk aversive firms would be allowed
to recover and yet would be protected from successful assertion of
claims against them. 3' In evaluating the propriety of such a result,
two factors should be noted. First, it is the risk takers that provide
the impetus to illegal activity. If the risk takers are deterred, the
courts need not be overly concerned with the risk aversive firms. So
long as the threat of suit by third parties and the government exists,
the entry of risk aversive firms upon a course of anticompetitive
activity will inevitably be less than fully voluntary.' Second, pro-
tecting risk aversive firms from recoveries by their coconspirators
will have little effect upon the actions of those firms. In terms of
deterrence the threat of recovery was redundant in the first place."'
The crucial question, however, is whether holding out a promise
of recovery without the offsetting threat of suit will significantly in-
crease the willingness of risk aversive firms to engage in illegal activ-
ity. The answer is almost certainly no.' 3 First of all, the firm's man-
agers will be unable to determine how a court will ultimately classify
the firm. 3 Thus, the rule that, all things being equal, all coconspira-
tors will be permitted to sue each other will require the managers to
presume that their firm Will not be immune from suit. 37 Second,
given the manner in which a risk aversive firm will be identified by
the courts,'38 a voluntary decision to run the risk will count heavily
against a firm when the court decides whether the defense should
be allowed. Third, although the promise of recovery may provide an
incentive to illegal activity, entitlement to that recovery is not easily
predicted,' 39 and the costs of failing to qualify are significant. 40
132. This is true whenever the risk aversive firm is suing a risk taking firm.
Where, however, the suit is between two risk aversive firms, the fact that no distinction
can be drawn with respect to the parties' susceptibility to deterrence will mandate that
the defendant not be allowed to assert the defense despite its status as a risk aversive
firm. See notes 124-27 supra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 105-10 supra and accompanying text.
134. It is the threat of suits by the government or third parties that keeps the
risk aversive firm from voluntarily embarking upon anticompetitive activity. See notes
105-10 supra and accompanying text. Those disincentives alone are sufficient, and
adding the threat of suit by coconspirators will not have any significant effect on its
pre-existing unwillingness to join in illegality.
135. In contrast, the disincentives of government and third party actions are ex
hypothesi insufficient to prevent the risk taking firms from undertaking illegal activity.
Thus, giving them the incentive of a possibility of recovery should their scheme go awry
will serve to increase, at least incrementally, their willingness to take the risks.
136. See note 108 supra.
137. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 143
infra.
138. See pp. 84-86 infra.
139. The standards proposed here are relative. See notes 145-46 infra and accom-
panying text. Thus, even a risk aversive firm's ability to gain a recovery from its
coconspirators or to avoid a recovery by them depends upon its being able to show that
it is more of a risk aversive firm than its adversary.
140. There is always the potential that a risk aversive firm defendant will be
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Given the awareness of the firm's managers that their own and
perhaps their firm's survival may depend upon avoiding antitrust
liability, it is exactly such gambles that risk aversive firms are un-
willing to take. Finally, the possibility of recovery from coconspira-
tors does nothing to alleviate the fears that keep risk aversive firms
honest in the first place. An incentive or deterrent, to be effective,
can only operate at the point of contemplation. The possibility of
recovery from coconspirators can provide encouragement, therefore,
only when the actor is operating under a significant, conscious, and
pre-existing fear that the conspiracy itself will prove to be unprofit-
able. The risk aversive firm, ex hypothesi, will not enter an anti-
competitive conspiracy even when it is guaranteed to enhance
profits,' for the deterring factor is not the questionable profitability
of the activity,"2 but the threat of treble damages. Thus, it appears
that even the "double incentive" of allowing the risk aversive firm to
sue but not be sued will have little, if any, effect upon its willingness
to engage in anticompetitive activity. Even if it does produce some
increase in the likelihood of participation by risk aversive firms, that
increase is far outweighed both in magnitude and significance by the
benefits that would accrue from deterring risk takers.
From the foregoing, three significant principles can be distilled:
(1) Since, all else being equal, deterrence is maximized
by allowing all coconspirators to sue, there should be a gen-
eral presumption against the availability of the defense of in
pari delictoY3
(2) As a consequence of the above presumption, in any
case in which the court is unable to make a meaningful dis-
tinction between the plaintiff and the defendant in terms of
their susceptibility to deterrence, the defendant should not
be permitted to interpose an in pari delicto defense."'
unable to sustain its burden of showing that it is less deserving of deterrence than the
plaintiff. See note 146 infra. Such a failure is impossible to predict at the moment of
contemplation, and the risk aversive firm will therefore be left in considerable doubt
as to whether it can avoid suits by its coconspirators.
141. See notes 105-10 supra and accompanying text.
142. In contrast, the only question for the risk taking firms is whether the profita-
bility of the contemplated activity, as discounted by the probability and magnitude
of the potential liability, is potentially greater than that which could be achieved
legally. If the answer is yes, the activity is pursued. See notes 111-13 supro and accom-
panying text.
143. See notes 124-27 supra and accompanying text.
144. Id. As noted earlier, this would reverse present practice with respect to
parties of equal fault. See note 127 supra.
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(3) Where, however, such a distinction can be made'
and it appears that the plaintiff is significantly more likely
than the defendant to enter upon such conspiracies voluntar-
ily,'46 the defendant should be permitted to raise in pari de-
licto as a defense. 4 7
C. IDENTIFYING THE RISK AVERSIVE FIRM
As outlined above, overall deterrence of anticompetitive activity
can be maximized by allowing risk aversive firms to assert the defense
of in pari delicto when sued by a risk taking firm,49 despite the fact
that, as a general matter, deterrence is best pursued by eliminating
the defense.' Obviously such a system requires that the courts have
some reasonable basis for attempting to distinguish between the two
classes of firms. It is probably unrealistic to suggest that such distinc-
tions can be made by a direct examination of the company's eco-
nomic strength and the perceptions of its management. But the
theory underlying the distinction suggests that these factors will
manifest themselves in certain activity,'50 which, if properly identi-
fied and evaluated, will lead to as accurate a determination as pos-
sible.
Although Justice White, in his Perma Life concurrence, was
seeking to distinguish between more and less culpable parties,'5 ' his
intuitions about the factors which should govern the availability of
the defense were nevertheless sound. He outlined four factors to be
examined:
(1) the relative responsibility for initiating the scheme;
145. Some of the factors upon which such a distinction would be based are
outlined in Section C infra.
146. The burden of proving the distinction and the relative voluntariness should
rest upon the defendant. Such a result is dictated by the presumption in favor of
allowing recoveries. See text accompanying note 143 supra.
147. It is probably this system at which the Perma Life plurality was aiming.
Justice Black's categorical rejection of in pari delicto followed so shortly by his reserva-
tion of the question whether "truly complete involvement and participation in a mono-
polistic scheme could ever be a basis . . . for barring a plaintiff's cause of action,"
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968), only
makes sense when interpreted as follows: in pari delicto has no place in antitrust
enforcement because, when plaintiff and defendant are equally culpable, deterrence
is maximized by allowing them to sue. It is only when the defendant is significantly
less culpable that allowing him to avoid liability should be considered. See notes 162-
64 infra and acompanying text.
148. See notes 128-42 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 124-27 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 105-13 supra and accompanying text.
151. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
146-47 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
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(2) whether the party could reasonably have been expected
to benefit from the illegality;
(3) the relative responsibility for maintaining the conspir-
acy and the degree to which the party attempted to with-
draw;
(4) the ultimate winners and losers.'5 2
While all of these factors may be equally important in determining
culpability, when the inquiry is properly focused on identifying risk
aversive firms, as opposed to culpable ones, it becomes clear that
the most important factors are those that indicate voluntariness of
participation. Risk aversive and risk taking firms are distinguished,
behaviorally, by the differences in their willingness to engage in
anticompetitive activity.' 3 Therefore, of the four factors outlined
by Justice White, the first and third are the most important. A risk
aversive firm will demonstrate reluctance at every point in the con-
spiracy. Its original entry will be less than fully voluntary; its parti-
cipation will be reluctant; it will resist efforts to broaden the con-
spiracy in scope or intensity; and it will attempt to withdraw or
bring the illegal activity to an end at the earliest possible moment.
In contrast, the risk taking firm will tend to enter the conspiracy
voluntarily, to perpetuate and expand it, and to resist efforts by
others to weaken or terminate the arrangement. Thus it is the degree
of voluntariness exhibited by the parties that must ultimately guide
the courts in determining which firms are entitled to assert the de-
fense.
By contrast, Justice White's second and fourth factors's' illus-
trate the misleading nature of the inquiry into "culpability." While
a firm's expectations of profit and the fulfillment of those expecta-
tions may have some bearing on the question of culpability, they
bear little if any relation to the more important question of the firm's
attitude toward risk. A reasonable expectation of benefit from the
illegal conduct is indicative of the nature of the firm only to the
extent that the scheme was not likely to benefit that party. That is,
if a firm embarks upon illegal activity despite the fact that it would
appear to be unprofitable, it is likely that the entry was not entirely
voluntary. This, in turn, may indicate that the firm is risk aversive.
On the other hand, however, the fact that the firm could reasonably
have been expected to benefit from the scheme reveals nothing signif-
icant about that firm's attitude toward risk. Similarly, that a party
did or did not ultimately profit from the illegal activity is irrelevant
to the question whether the firm is willing to risk violation of the
antitrust laws in -order to maximize profits.
152. See id.
153. See notes 105-13 supra and accompanying text.
154. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
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Such a list of factors can never be more than exemplary-
indeed, the relevant considerations will vary from case to case. Never-
theless, it is clear that the inquiry must be rooted in an effort to
maximize deterrence rather than retribution and that the maximi-
zation of deterrence is a function not of culpability but of the nature
of the actors. Before ruling on the appropriateness of an in pari
delicto defense, therefore, the court should determine whether the
defendant has demonstrated a basic unwillingness to enter into and
maintain the conspiracy sufficient to indicate that deterring it is
relatively less important than denying to the plaintiff the incentive
of recovery. It is expected that if the courts approach the question
of in pari delicto in such a manner, deterrence will be substantially
enhanced and the decisions will be more lucid, consistent, and
valuable.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a general matter, the plurality opinion in Perma Life appears
to have been well conceived. In most cases, in pari delicto does indeed
have no place in antitrust enforcement,"'5 for as a deterrent the threat
of suit even with a concomittant possibility of recovery is far more
effective than a deprivation of the opportunity to recover from cocon-
spirators.'56 It is equally true, however, that, as the Perma Life plu-
rality intimated,'57 the maximization of deterrence will occasionally
justify ignoring the general rule and allowing the defendant to resist
recovery.55 The plurality's failure lay in its inability to formulate
guidelines that would direct the lower courts in applying that excep-
tion. This gap was, at least in part, filled by Justice White in his
concurrence,' but his contribution was vitiated by his failure to
recognize that the nature of the actor and not his culpability deter-
mines the effectiveness of deterrence.6 0 This confusion has not
surprisingly been reflected in the lower court decisions following
Perma Life. First, the lower courts have been largely inarticulate
in describing the standards that govern the availability of the de-
fense.'"' Second, because of their emphasis on culpability, the courts
have consistently failed to examine the factor that originally justified
the Perma Life result: the effect that allowing or disallowing the
defense would have on deterrence. Instead, they have formulated a
155. See 392 U.S. at 140.
156. See notes 124-27 supra and accompanying text.
157. See 392 U.S. at 140; note 147 supra.
158. See notes 128-44 supra and accompanying text.
159. 392 U.S. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring).
160. See notes 151-54 supra and accompanying text.
161. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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system rooted primarily in retribution'6 2 and at best coincidentally
related to deterring antitrust violations.' 0 Finally, as a result of the
emphasis on culpability, the courts have come full circle, largely
reversing the presumption implicit in the Perma Life plurality
opinion that allowance of the defense should be the exception rather
than the rule, and have generally denied the defense only when the
plaintiff is significantly less culpable than the defendant. 6
This Note has attempted to point out some of these problems,
to suggest a proper theoretical basis for examining the relation be-
tween in pari delicto and deterrence of antitrust violations, and to
outline, at least generally, the factors involved in determining
whether a given situation is exceptional enough to warrant allowing
the defense. It remains for the courts to clarify and enlarge upon those
factors. But successful deterrence can be effectively pursued only if
the courts emphasize prevention of future violations and formulate
their decisions in a considered effort to maximize deterrence.
162. See notes 54-67 supra and accompanying text; note 127 supra.
163. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 54-67 supra and accompanying text.
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